Papers that are related to the ToK System...

Beyond the Justification Hypothesis: A Broader Theory of the Evolution of Self-Consciousness
Vazire & Robins, 2004:

We evaluate Henriques’ Justification Hypothesis (JH; this issue, pp. 1207– 1221) and argue that his explanation for the evolution of self-consciousness is overly narrow and the evolutionary sequence of events is backwards. Instead, we propose a broader theory of the evolution of self-consciousness,with four categories of adaptive functions: (a) self-regulation, (b) selective information processing, (c) understanding others, and (d) identity formation.
Defining Psychology: What Can It Do for Us?

Haaga, 2004:
"Psychology," like many abstract terms, is difficult to define precisely. Henriques' (this issue, pp. 1207-1221) argument that psychology, though unified and coherent, actually spans two realms-psychological formalism ("the science of mind," this issue, p. 1211) and human psychology ("the science of human behavior at the individual level," this issue, p. 1208)- seems likely to improve the clarity of the concept. The strongest contribution of his analysis may be its placing "psychology" in the larger conceptual framework of the Tree of Knowledge taxonomy.
Defining Psychology: Is It Worth the Trouble?

Lilienfeld, 2004:
Henrique’s thoughtful effort (this issue, pp. 1207–1221) to define psychology suffers from at least three shortcomings:(a) “psychology” is almost certainly an inherently fuzzy concept that resists precise definition; (b) attempts to define psychology are likely to hamper rather than foster consilience across scientific disciplines; and (c) Henriques incorrectly diagnoses the cause of the scientist–practitioner gap and hence offers an incorrect prescription. The sources of this gap lie not in intractable definitional disputes, but in fundamentally different approaches to acquiring knowledge.
Justifying the Justification Hypothesis:
Scientific- Humanism, Equilintegration (EI) Theory, and the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI)
Shealey, 2004:
The Justification Hypothesis (JH; Henriques, 2003) is a basic, general,and macro-level construct that is highly compelling. However, it needs greater specification (i.e., justification) regarding what it is, how it might be operationalized and measured, and what it does and does not predict in the real world. In the present analysis, the act of “justification” is conceptualized as the ongoing attempt to convince self and/or others that one’s beliefs and values, which is to say one’s “version of reality” or VOR, is correct, defensible, and good. In addressing these issues, this paper is divided into two complementary parts: (a) consideration of justification dynamics and exemplars from a scientific-humanist perspective and (b) an examination of how justification systems and processes have been studied vis-à-vis research and theory on beliefs and values as well as an extant model—Equilintegration (EI) Theory—and method—the Beliefs, Events, and Values Inventory (BEVI).
Metarepresentation and the Great Cognitive Divide: A Commentary on Henriques’ “Psychology Defined”

Stanovich, 2004:

I locate the discontinuity between humans and other animals a bit differently than Henriques (this issue, pp. 1207–1221)—in metarepresentational abilities. However, I do think that the justification process might have played a critical role in the development of these metarepresentational abilities.
From Mirror Self-Recognition to the Looking-Glass Self: Exploring the Justification Hypothesis

Shaffer, 2004:
In his Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System, Henriques (2003) posits that the human ego or “self” has evolved because human beings are the only animals that have had to justify their behavior to others. This essay provides evidence for this Justification Hypothesis (JH) from everyday life sociology, starting with the work of George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley, and focuses on research related to the concept of the “looking-glass self.” Special emphasis is given to the pragmatics of speech acts, the presentation of self in interaction rituals, the accounts given by actors in justification of their actions, and the role of social norms and conformity in the large-scale justification systems commonly called “culture.”
The Motivation to Control and
the Origin of Mind: Exploring the
Life–Mind Joint Point in the Tree of Knowledge System
Geary, 2004:

The evolved function of brain, cognitive, affective, conscious-psychological, and behavioral systems is to enable animals to attempt to gain control of the social (e.g., mates), biological (e.g., prey), and physical (e.g., nesting spots) resources that have tended to covary with survival and reproductive outcomes during the species’ evolutionary history. These resources generate information patterns that range from invariant to variant. Invariant information is consistent across generations and within lifetimes (e.g., the prototypical shape of a human face) and is associated with modular brain and cognitive systems that coalesce around the domains of folk psychology, folk biology, and folk physics. The processing of information in these domains is implicit and results in automatic bottom-up behavioral responses. Variant information varies across generations and within lifetimes (e.g., as in social dynamics) and is associated with plastic brain and cognitive systems and explicit, consciously driven top-down behavioral responses. The fundamentals of this motivation-to-control model are outlined and links are made to Henriques’ (2004) Tree of Knowledge System and Behavioral Investment Theory.
A Much Needed Macro Level View:
A Commentary on Henriques’ “Psychology Defined”

Gilbert, 2004:
To develop greater coherence, psychology must develop its macro and integrative approaches to the mind. In this illuminating paper, Henriques (this issue, pp. 1207–1221) outlines the kind of thinking that is needed. He skillfully illuminates the levels of emergence of mind from the material world and argues that the recursive self-regulative abilities of selfawareness set us apart from other animals. The interaction between an evolved mind, adapted to pursue strategic goals, while also being phenotypically shaped by both environment and our recently evolved cognitive competencies, is a core focus of psychology.
Pluralism in the Sciences Is Not Easily Dismissed

Viney, 2004:
The unification scheme proposed by Henriques in his article “Psychology Defined” (this issue, pp. 1207–1221) holds promise as a coherent and comprehensive approach to psychology and as a helpful way to think about the relation of psychology to other sciences. There is, nevertheless, room for concern that there is no concept of unification to date that does not neglect important dimensions of human experience. It is argued that the disunities in psychology need not result in a sense of disciplinary inferiority. In fact, many leading scholars now challenge the belief that other sciences are models of integration and unity. It is also argued that there are not true type identities between levels of organization (e.g., experience and underlying neurological processes). Accordingly, there are serious questions about the kind of unity that can be achieved.
Psychology’s Dilemma: An Institutional Neurosis?

Katzko, 2004:
The term psychology refers both to an institutional discipline and to a subject matter. Henriques, in his article “Psychology Defined” (this issue, pp. 1207-1221), emphasizes the second reference, and its focus can be sharpened by taking into account the first reference. On the one hand, epistemic progress in science is a dynamic process, which, as often as not, cuts across institutional divisions. However, on the other hand there are some problems of disunity that solely concern the institution. That the latter falls within the scope of the Tree of Knowledge is illustrated in how Henriques’ “Justification Hypothesis” sheds light on the nature of institutional disunity.
How Does Psychotherapy Influence Personality?
A Theoretical Integration

Mayer, 2004:
A given type of psychotherapy (e.g., psychodynamic) is associated with a set of specific change techniques (e.g., interpreting defenses, identifying relationship themes). Different change techniques can be conceived of as influencing different parts of personality (e.g., interpreting defense increases conscious awareness). An integrated model of personality is presented. Then, change techniques from different theoretical perspectives are assigned by judges to areas of personality the techniques are believed to influence. The results suggest that specific change techniques can be reliably sorted into the areas of personality. Thinking across theoretical perspectives leads to important new opportunities for assessment, therapy outcome research, and communication with patients concerning personality change.
Remythologizing Culture: Narrativity, Justification, and the Politics of Personalization

Quackenbush, 2004:
The thesis that the self is a story unfolding in prescriptive space is typically embraced by social constructionists as a radical alternative to naturalistic accounts of human development. Yet, the Tree of Knowledge (ToK) System proposed by Henriques (2003) implies that events at multiple levels of analysis (i.e., matter, life, mind, and culture) can be considered as conditions of possibility for the emergence of meaningful personal narratives. Thus, the ToK System represents an opportunity to recast the work of naturalists and social constructionists in a framework that is at once scientific and humanistic.
Rooting the Tree of Knowledge: A Response to Henriques’ “Psychology Defined”

Presbury, 2004:
Neither science nor culture could exist without a participant–observer and a conceiving human mind. Being-in-the-world, or “Dasein,” as Heidegger termed it, is fundamental to anyconceptual understanding we have of how things work in the universe. There is no view from nowhere. Psychologyis the primordial ground in which the tree of knowledge has its roots.
Some Discontents With Theoretical Unification:
A Response to Henriques’ “Psychology Defined”

Yanchar, 2004:
In response to Henriques’ article “Psychology Defined” (this issue, pp. 1207– 1221), I argue that theoretical unification should not be pursued for its own sake and that many psychologists are unlikely to endorse the specific unifying principles of the Tree of Knowledge System. It is suggested that other scholarly endeavors such as the open pursuit of truth, sustained dialogue among diverse discourse communities, and critical reflection on psychological theories and practice are more important than theoretical unification.
Taxonomy as a Contextualist Views It

Hayes, 2004:
The Henriques’ article, “Psychology Defined” (this issue, pp. 1207– 1221), reflects an underlying philosophy of science that emphasizes coherence as its truth criterion. The taxonomic efforts that result are of unknown value when viewed from other philosophical positions. From the point of view of functional contextualism, the primary metric of successful science is not coherence per se, but the precision, scope, and depth of the analysis as a means of predicting and influencing psychological phenomena. Henriques presents neither data nor specific research proposals that would allow even the beginning application of such a metric. Thus, the proposed taxonomy has no known value when viewed contextualistically. Since the practical goals of clinical psychology are very similar to those of functional contextualism, clinical psychologists interested in making a practical difference will have few current empirical reasons to be attracted to this taxonomy.
Testing the Limits of Henriques’ Proposal:
Wittgensteinian Lessons and Hermeneutic Dialogue

Slife, 2004:
The limits of Henriques’ “overarching conceptions” approach to defining psychology is first tested by comparing and contrasting his conceptions to two burgeoning movements within psychology: qualitative research and spiritual therapy strategies. These movements were selected because they represent many other fragments of a fragmented psychology that could fall outside Henriques’ disciplinary matrix. This comparison reveals how the broader discipline of psychology resists propositional definitions, such as Henriques’ proposal. As the later work of Wittgenstein (1958) reveals, one cannot unite the various language games of a discipline’s discourse communities through common overarching features. Next, another approach to unification and definition is outlined—hermeneutic dialogue. Unlike an overarching framework, hermeneutic dialogue does not require “joint points.” In fact, it assumes that the richness and vitality of a discipline can be drained away by such “unifying” principles. Instead, hermeneutic dialogue is a way of relating and unifying while preserving the integrity and identity of even incommensurable factions within a discipline.
Toward a Consilient Science of Psychology

Rand & Ilardi, 2004:
From its inception, psychology has been characterized by conceptual fragmentation and slow scientific progress (Henriques, 2004; Meehl, 1978). In contrast, the natural sciences have achieved in recent decades a remarkable degree of consilience—the linking of fact, theory, and method across disciplines (and subdisciplines) and across nested levels of informational complexity (Wilson, 1998). Although such consilience serves as a potent catalyst of scientific discovery, there exist several barriers to the emergence of a consilient science of psychology (e.g., the persistent influence of dualism, longstanding internecine discord, resistance to perceived reductionism, etc.). We discuss the manner in which the development of metatheoretical frameworks (including Henriques’ Tree of Knowledge model) may play an important role in addressing such barriers. Likewise, we describe the hybrid interdisciplinary domain of cognitive neuroscience, which provides an empirically testable metatheory and a promising consilient bridge between psychology and the natural sciences.
The Unification of Psychology
and Psychological Organizations

Stricker, 2004:
The Tree of Knowledge is an imaginative attempt to construct a metatheoretical system that proposes to unify the discipline of psychology. However, it is limited in its appreciation of political factors, and so an optimistic view of the possibility of the system overlooks the power issues that beset the field.
Unifying Psychology:
Epistemological Act or Disciplinary Maneuver?

Stam, 2004:
Two arguments with attempts to unify psychology are adumbrated in this commentary. First, the unification of psychology is largely a disciplinary maneuver and not primarily an epistemological act. Second, the discipline of psychology has been unified for some time around a series of methodological and functional categories that have served to support its institutional projects but hide metaphysical problems.
Unity Within Psychology, and
Unity Between Science and Practice

Kihlstrom, 2004:
The unity of psychology as a science is to be found in its definition as the science of mental life, and its explanation of individual behavior in terms of mental states. This disciplinary focus will help negotiate psychology’s relations with other disciplines, such as neuroscience and cognitive science. The unity within psychology between science and practice is to be found in a focus on scientific evidence as the source of the status, autonomy, and privileges of professional practitioners. Psychology should avoid the temptations of reductionism, and assert (and enjoy) its twin status as both a biological science and a social science.